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Abstract: This article examines how neoliberal policies mandated by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) impact on corruption in developing countries. Combining domestic political analysis with 
international political economy perspectives, we hypothesize that these reforms concentrate losses on 
influential social groups such as businesses and civil servants, who then engage in corrupt practices to 
maintain their privileged positions. Using an original dataset of IMF policy reforms from 1980-2014, 
we find robust empirical support for our argument. Results of regression-based analysis demonstrate 
an effect of IMF policy reforms that holds across multiple samples and measures of corruption: 141 
countries using a corruption control measure from the International Country Risk Guide; 70 countries 
on the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey; and 19 countries from the 
International Crime Victims Survey. Our findings elucidate the link between neoliberal globalization 
and political capitalism, while offering important policy lessons regarding the design of policy 
reforms.   
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1.  Introduction  
How and why can efforts to curb the use of public office for private gain fail? This question has 
long vexed social scientists. Max Weber pointed to the perversion of “modern rational capitalism 
[with its] structures of law and administration” into “politically determined capitalism” (Weber 
2001, xxxviii). This type of capitalism is supported by politically-privileged monopoly industries, 
colonialism, piracy, and the extraction of hyper-profits through the state (Weber 1978, 480; 2001, 
122). Such activities are now more commonly referred to as “crony capitalism” (Hamm, King, 
and Stuckler 2012; Hutchcroft 1998; Kang 2002; Karadag 2010; King 2002), where patron-client 
relationships between politically-connected capitalists and corrupt bureaucrats entrench both petty 
corruption—the bribes in interactions between public officials and societal actors—and grand 
corruption—the abuse of power by political elites to further the spoils of economic elites (Doig 
and Theobald 1999; Johnston 2005; Lambsdorff 2002). 
Social scientists have devoted much attention to identifying the domestic determinants of crony 
capitalism. For example, modernization theorists hailed economic development as the best 
insurance against corruption (Lipset 1960), emphasizing the beneficial role of “human capital” 
(Glaeser et al. 2004; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Svensson 2005) and the deleterious impact of resource 
abundance (Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008). Others emphasized the role of political 
systems, arguing corruption is less likely to thrive in democracies due to increased government 
accountability (Dumas, Wedel, and Callman 2010; Larraín and Tavares 2004; Montinola and 
Jackman 2002), and in meritocratic bureaucracies due to limited opportunities for career 
advancement for corrupt bureaucrats (Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2011; Evans and Rauch 
1999; McDonnell 2017; Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001).  
Likewise, internationally-oriented accounts have also sought to explain the determinants of 
corruption. Notably, one strand of research in international political economy and development 
studies has elucidated the mechanisms that perpetuate conditions of underdevelopment, including 
corruption, in the Global South (Amsden 2007; Chang 2002; Chang and Grabel 2004). In a classic 
formulation, Evans (1979) explained how the state can become an instrument of domestic 
capitalists and political actors allied with international capital, which—in turn—delivers 
concentrated benefits to ruling economic and political elites but fails to improve long-run 
developmental trajectories. Beyond the attention to global capital, these accounts often emphasize 
the role of the Western-designed bureaucratic apparatus of free-market globalization; that is, 
powerful international organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
and the World Trade Organization. The policies promoted by this group of actors have often 
aimed to limit the size of states—whether through the advocacy of fiscal austerity or through 
economic deregulation that can entrench weak regulatory capacity (Babb and Chorev 2016; 
Panitch and Gindin 2013). Such policies purportedly help limit corruption by reducing rent-
seeking opportunities (IMF 2017), notwithstanding evidence that government consumption has no 
discernible impact on corruption (Gerring and Thacker 2005; Hopkin and Rodríguez-Pose 2007; 
Persson and Rothstein 2015). 
The potentially deleterious effects of IMF and World Bank activities on corruption may appear 
surprising at first. After all, these organizations have spearheaded the anti-corruption policy 
agenda. For example, when the World Bank faced mounting criticism in the mid-1990s for 
overlooking corruption, then-president James Wolfensohn established a working group that urged 
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the Bank to “[a]ddress corruption and its economic effects more explicitly in country assistance 
strategies and the design of projects” (World Bank 1997). Similarly, the IMF formulated a policy 
strategy on governance and corruption to be implemented in its three main activity areas—country 
lending, technical assistance, and economic surveillance (IMF 1997). With these strategies, the 
IMF and World Bank positioned themselves as vanguards against crony capitalism (e.g., IMF 
2017).   
To scrutinize such claims and advance our understanding of the international determinants of 
corruption, we focus on the activities of the IMF, given its mandate for advising developing 
countries on aggregate economic policy. The organization provides countries in financial turmoil 
with fresh loans at preferential terms (low interest rates and long maturities), in exchange for the 
implementation of policy reforms ostensibly designed to halt economic freefall. For the first four 
post-war decades, the IMF almost exclusively advocated “stabilization conditions,” stipulating 
fiscal austerity and currency devaluation with the aim of short-term balance-of-payments 
stabilization (Babb 2007; Polak 1991). Importantly, such conditions took the form of quantitative 
targets, and left governments some discretion to meet them by relying on a policy mix they saw fit 
(Nelson 1984). However, since the mid-1980s, the IMF increasingly came to rely on “structural 
conditions” (Easterly 2005; Stiglitz 2002). These entail measures to deregulate economic sectors, 
liberalize trade, and privatize state-owned assets (Summers and Pritchett 1993), which are 
commonly identified as “neoliberal” policies (Centeno and Cohen 2012; Evans and Sewell 2013; 
Sassen 2014). By making access to credit conditional on the commitment to such structural policy 
reforms, the IMF became an engine of neoliberal globalization (Babb 2013; Centeno and Cohen 
2012; Chorev and Babb 2009). 
We posit that neoliberal policies promoted by the IMF foster crony capitalism. Our model of 
underlying mechanisms proceeds as follows. As noted by political economists, IMF-mandated 
reforms have distributional consequences: some social groups may benefit, while others lose 
(Drazen 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Nelson 1984). This is particularly true for structural 
conditions, which impose concentrated losses on certain groups—including businesses and public 
officials—because they are designed to eliminate previously granted privileges. On the one hand, 
affected businesses may engage in corrupt practices to maintain their privileges through other 
means (Coate and Morris 2006). On the other, civil servants may become more corrupt because 
structural conditions threaten their own benefits, for instance due to public sector employment 
reforms (Callaghy 1989). Further, the general retreat of the state in the economy brought about by 
structural reforms reduces the ability of the state to detect corrupt behavior (Ban 2016). 
Consequently, we expect structural conditions to increase corruption. This expectation does not 
hold for stabilization conditions, which—although unpopular—do not impose concentrated losses, 
as they leave governments with flexibility to distribute adjustment burdens more evenly.  
We test our proposition using a new dataset on IMF conditionality from 1980 to 2014, based on 
original coding of the Letters of Intent and associated Memoranda of Economic and Financial 
Policies between the Fund and its borrowers. We rely on a regression-based instrumental-variable 
research design to account for potential endogeneity of IMF conditionality and non-random 
selection into IMF programs. Across multiple samples and measures of corruption, we find robust 
support for the corruption-inducing effects of structural conditions. An initial analysis uses a 
perception-based corruption control measure from the International Country Risk Guide for up to 
90 countries on a sample period of 30 years; subsequent analyses employ experience-based 
4 
 
measures of corruption by firms from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey and by households from the International Crime Victim Survey, available for a restricted 
number of observations. 
Our findings highlight the self-undermining nature of neoliberal globalization (Babb 2013). 
According to neoclassical economics, structural conditions should foster free-market capitalism 
and unleash economic growth by strengthening private-sector initiatives and improving the 
business climate (Khan and Knight 1981). These conditions should also limit corruption by 
removing rent-seeking opportunities, a notion that became widely accepted among policy 
economists (Krueger 1974; Tanzi 1998) and that provided the IMF with rationale for extending its 
policy toolkit. However, our results suggest that IMF programs—and neoliberal globalization, of 
which they are a constituent part—have adverse effects on corruption control, with negative 
implications for economic growth, social capital, and the functioning of democracy in the 
developing world (Mauro 1995; Rothstein and Eek 2009; Wei 2000). The concentrated losses that 
structural reforms impose give rise to crony capitalism by furthering collusion between rent-
seeking interest groups and public bureaucrats whose status and privileges come under attack. 
Thus, rather than promoting the Weberian ideal of modern rational capitalism (Weber 1978), 
neoliberal globalization fosters a perverse political capitalism.  
 
2.  Neoliberal globalization and links to corruption abatement  
Neoliberalism is widely understood as a transnational policy paradigm that advocates a reduction 
of the role of the state in the economy and the promotion of free markets as the legitimate engine 
of economic development (Babb 2013; Centeno and Cohen 2012; Evans and Sewell 2013). The 
associated policy prescriptions include liberalization of trade and finance, deregulation of 
economic activities, and the privatization of natural resources and public enterprises (Harvey 
2007). Social scientists broadly accept that the emergence of neoliberal globalization—the 
growing interconnectedness of national economies on neoliberal terms—was not inevitable, but 
deliberately brought about by actors with neoliberal preferences: Western states, transnational 
capitalists, and epistemic communities (Harvey 2007; Panitch and Gindin 2013; Slobodian 2018). 
In this context, powerful international organizations like the IMF or the World Bank diffused 
neoliberal rules and norms at the behest of Western countries, often to the benefit of economic 
interests within these countries (Chorev and Babb 2009; Copelovitch 2010; Malik and Stone 
2018). 
Lending programs of the IMF—often known as “structural adjustment programs”—are key 
vehicles through which the organization has mandated governments to adopt neoliberal policies, 
including measures that promise to limit corruption (Babb 2009; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 
2007; IMF 2017). Indeed, in some lending programs, the IMF promoted the overhaul of 
ministries, revenue collection agencies, and public administrations (IMF 2017, 32). The bulk of 
IMF conditionality, however, has entailed fiscal consolidation and market liberalization: policy 
conditions to cut government expenditure are ubiquitous in IMF programs, and—while their 
primary purpose is to restore budget balance—they also purportedly serve to remove rent-seeking 
opportunities. For example, high public spending is thought to increase the number of public 
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procurement contracts and discretion for officials to handle such projects, thus increasing 
opportunities for corrupt behavior (Becker 1995; Klitgaard 1988, 5; Tanzi 1998, 12).  
IMF conditions also mandate the elimination of government regulations. While the primary 
rationale of such conditions is to unleash market forces to promote economic growth (Khan and 
Knight 1981), another objective is to reduce corrupt behavior (IMF 1997). Excessive regulation is 
seen as a driver of corruption because “the existence of such regulations and authorizations gives 
a kind of monopoly power to the officials who must authorize or inspect the activities […] They 
can thus use their public power to extract bribes from whose who need the authorizations or 
permits” (Tanzi 1998, 10). Further, complex tax laws, reliance on tax officials to collect income 
taxes, and public service provision below market prices all supposedly create entry points for 
corrupt behavior. Cutting these extensive regulations should therefore limit day-to-day corruption 
in the bureaucratic service (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1999). 
Since the 1990s, eliminating government regulation has become standard requirement in IMF 
programs (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). 
We question the corruption-abating effect of neoliberal reforms, and instead posit that they can 
induce corruption, especially in the context of IMF programs when pressures on state institutions 
are elevated by economic crisis.  
Concentrated effects of structural conditions 
Structural conditions formulate concrete policy objectives, while at the same time defining the 
policy instrument by which these objectives ought to be achieved—that is, they “micro-manage” 
economic policies (Woo 2013, 301). These conditions, which include detailed prescriptions like 
the elimination of tariffs on certain imported goods, the removal of subsidies for certain 
industries, and the privatization of specific public assets, imply concentrated losses for well-
defined groups in society. One such group is businesses in a specific industry. For example, in a 
lending program to the Philippines, the IMF required the government “to abolish one half of the 
quantitative import restrictions,” as well as to “remov[e] altogether the restrictions on entry by 
foreign banks” (IMF 1994, 19). The IMF commonly mandates governments to abolish measures 
that protect some domestic producers from international competition, such as subsidies or tax 
exemptions. The removal of these protections implies economic losses for these actors. 
Other groups that face concentrated losses include the military, public-sector employees, and 
urban labor (Haggard and Kaufman 1989; Nelson 1992; Rickard and Caraway 2018). Structural 
conditions may require governments to adopt reforms to pension systems, public-sector wages, 
and other entitlements. For example, Burundi’s IMF loan mandated a ceiling on the government 
wage bill, covering “total labor remunerations […] for civil servants, contractual employees, and 
military personnel of the central government, including all allowances and bonuses” (IMF 2004, 
54). Structural conditions also (de)regulate private-sector  labor relations, typically by allowing 
non-standard work contracts, easing dismissal provisions, and weakening collective worker rights 
(Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012).  
Some structural conditions are particularly corruption-inducing as they inflict losses on multiple 
interest groups. The privatization of state-owned enterprises provides a case in point. In some 
types of privatization—for example, competitive auctions—managers and workers lose out 
against global corporations as they lack the financial capacity to submit competitive bids (Lewis 
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and Stein 1997). Within countries, privatization exacerbates unequal distribution of wealth, which 
is also known to fuel corruption (You and Khagram 2005). For example, in Russia in the mid-
1990s, “well-connected managers owe their wealth to massive privatization” (Stone 2002, 150), 
while the less-well connected managers, workers, and street-level bureaucrats lose public sector 
privileges they previously held. Privatization is a key policy area in IMF programs, with around 
30% of all programs between 1980 and 2014 including at least one privatization condition 
(Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). 
Affected groups mobilize to retain their privileges 
As structural conditions inflict concentrated losses on well-defined, narrow social groups, it is 
precisely these groups which can mobilize resources to prevent reforms. Indeed, powerful 
economic interest groups will oppose reforms that reduce their ability to engage in rent-seeking 
(Drazen 2006, 57). Businesses can offer bribes to prevent the removal of certain exemptions that 
are beneficial to them or demand alternative compensation (Coate and Morris 2006). As 
government elites depend on the support of powerful economic interests for their own survival, 
they can continue protecting these groups by distributing rents in new ways. Arguably, IMF 
conditionality cannot eliminate all means by which governments could plausibly distribute 
economic rents (Coate and Morris 2006, 40); and so, upon removal of one structural distortion, 
the government devises another measure to continue rent distribution. For instance, the 
government might be required to privatize a state-owned firm, which removes the possibility of 
direct subsidies from the general government budget to the firm. However, under private 
ownership, the firm might benefit from government-devised regulation to protect its previous 
rents (Drazen 2006, 72). In Uganda, policy conditions targeted the privatization of public 
enterprises, but the government—hesitant for fear of losing a vital tool to buy political support—
managed the process in a non-transparent way to cover up insider deals and conflicts of interest 
(Mwenda and Tangri 2005, 454).  
In addition to firms, civil servants form an important political interest group, and can upset policy 
implementation (Haggard and Kaufman 1989; Nelson 1984, 107; Waterbury 1992, 182). By 
controlling the very institutions of the state, public officials are in a particularly powerful position 
to thwart or render ineffective policy reforms introduced in times of economic crisis (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1992, 19). This gives civil servants a lever to fend off attempts to reduce their discretion 
or to erode their status and privileges imposed by structural conditions.  
In short, structural conditions provide key economic, bureaucratic, and political actors with 
incentives to be more corrupt. First, some firms must expect to lose protection. Since they have 
previously invested in the protected sector (and switching to other sectors usually is costly), they 
are willing to pay for such protection to continue (Coate and Morris 2006). Second, public 
officials with some discretion over the implementation of reform will be more susceptible to 
accept bribes because structural conditions—particularly the ones that require cuts to wages, 
pensions, and social security—threaten their own privileges (Haque and Sahay 1996). In return 
for bribes, these officials can use their discretion either to selectively delay implementation of a 
reform, or to devise a new mechanism to redistribute rents to a bribing firm. Third, governments 
may tolerate corruption because their own political survival depends on the support of key groups, 
notably business interests and public-sector employees.  
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Of course, this discussion begs the question of why public officials might self-select into IMF 
programs that are likely to pose a serious threat to their own material well-being. First, 
heterogeneity among public officials must be considered: the bureaucrats likely to request and 
negotiate the terms of IMF loans are overwhelmingly located within the Ministry of Finance, 
commonly among its higher echelons (Mussa and Savastano 2000, 128). By extension, they might 
be more willing to sign up to extensive reforms that may hurt the civil service as a whole but 
leave themselves less affected. In contrast, the civil servants who are most affected—from tax 
collectors to nurses—lack voice in the negotiations with the IMF. Second, more broadly, while 
IMF programs can harm the well-being of social actors, they are often less harmful for social 
welfare than outright country defaults (Kentikelenis 2017, 302). Consequently, public officials 
might want to pursue a policy course—like entering an IMF loan—that keeps the country afloat, 
which also allows some actors to devise ways to compensate for the loss of privileges.  
Relatedly, once countries have entered in IMF programs, why might public officials not simply 
opt to block or delay the implementation of reforms that would harm their welfare, rather than 
resort to risky bribe-taking? The explanation here relates to the iterative nature of IMF loans: they 
are not one-off agreements, but entail phased disbursements of loan tranches (Mussa and 
Savastano 2000, 88–90). This means that when implementation stalls, the IMF refuses to approve 
tranche transfers, which also has follow-on implications for economic activity and a government’s 
reputation. In these circumstances, corruption—among some actors, at least—might be tolerated 
by governments wishing to maintain support among some key constituencies, like businesses or 
civil servants.  
Observable implications 
Our argument entails several empirical implications. First and foremost, we expect a positive 
relationship between structural conditions and corruption levels. This relationship should be 
especially pronounced when interest groups are more powerful, because they will be able to 
mobilize more resources to prevent implementation of reforms, with more corruption as a result.  
Second, our argument has testable implications for stabilization conditions. Unlike structural 
conditions, stabilization conditions leave governments more discretion as to how they implement 
broad macroeconomic objectives. Political economists have long noted that “austerity harms 
many groups” (Nelson 1984, 106), indicating that governments indeed use the flexibility provided 
by stabilization conditions to spread the adjustment burden more widely across the economy 
(relative to structural conditions). Government discretion over condition implementation alleviates 
some potential threats to special interests imposed by conditionality, and corruption may not be 
affected as a result.  
Finally, our theoretical argument also helps predict the timing of effects. While the (envisaged) 
removal of structural distortions during IMF programs immediately creates incentives for 
corruption, it will likely persist over the medium term. This is because structural reforms prompt 
the state and the business sector to engage in patron-client relationships which take some time to 
emerge and solidify (Ganev 2007; King and Szelenyi 2005; Weber 1978). They reinforce the rise 
of “political accumulators”—managers who generate rents through political connections—over 




3.  Data and methods  
3.1.  Operationalization  
Dependent variables 
We test our theory using three data sources. Our first source is the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). We use as dependent variable the level of corruption control, which coincides with 
our definition of corruption presented above. This perception-based indicator is widely used 
among scholars studying corruption (e.g., Adserà, Boix, and Payne 2003; Dreher and Siemers 
2009; Larraín and Tavares 2004; Sandholtz and Gray 2003). The measure CONTROL OF 
CORRUPTION scores low when there is widespread “financial corruption in the form of demands 
for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessments, police protection, or loans” (The PRS Group 2015). An advantage of this indicator is 
its broad coverage. Our time-series cross-section includes a maximum of 141 developing 
countries observed from 1984 to 2014; due to missing observations, the panel is unbalanced.1  
Second, we rely on the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS 2016) 
to obtain three experience-based corruption measures: INCIDENCE OF CORRUPTION (percentage of 
firms reporting bribery in dealings with the state); INTENSITY OF CORRUPTION (percentage of 
public transactions where a gift or informal payment was requested);2 and CORRUPT TAX OFFICIAL 
(percentage of firms asked for bribe payments in interactions with tax officials). Matching the 
survey frequency of three years, we average all explanatory variables over consecutive three-year 
periods and lag them by one period to allow for some delay in the effect. After discarding 
countries with data for only one wave, we are left with 70 countries, of which 64 had two waves 
and 6 had three waves between 2002 and 2016.  
Third, we use data from the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS). The variable 
CORRUPTION indicates the percentage of respondents experiencing attempts of bribery in public 
transactions (van Kesteren 2003). We discard high-income countries and countries with less than 
two waves asking corruption-related questions, leaving us with 19 countries and various survey 
years from 1996 to 2005. These countries are located mostly in Central and Eastern Europe and 
thus are not representative of all developing countries (see Appendix B).  
The motivation for using experience-based indicators—in addition to the ICRG measure—relates 
to criticism against subjective indicators (Stubbs, King, and Stuckler 2014). Using experienced-
based measures preempts these concerns and probes the robustness of our findings. While the two 
survey datasets are the best available sources for experienced-based measures of corruption 
(Olken and Pande 2012), the number of observations is substantially reduced.  
Independent variables 
To measure our IMF variables, we use a newly constructed database on IMF conditionality based 
on expert coding of individual conditions from all agreements between the IMF and the borrowing 
                                                          
1 
As the ICRG data is available monthly, we average the country observations for a given year. 
2
 A small caveat of these corruption indicators is that non-response is treated as corruption experience.  
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countries from 1980 to 2014 (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016). This dataset includes detailed 
information on the different forms and policy areas of conditionality. 
Our key predictor is the number of binding STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS in an IMF program. These 
conditions often include measures to privatize state-owned enterprises, liberalize prices, and 
deregulate economic sectors (Summers and Pritchett 1993). Some structural conditions require 
changes to government institutions (such as mergers of ministries), establishment of independent 
expert bodies, and public-sector employment conditions. We also measure the number of 
STABILIZATION CONDITIONS, which typically entail targets on international reserves, exchange 
rates, the fiscal balance, and the wage bill. Appendix A offers examples for both types of 
conditions. Following established procedures (Copelovitch 2010; Stubbs et al. 2017; Woo 2013), 
we only consider binding conditions because they directly determine scheduled disbursements of 
loans. We also control for the presence of an IMF PROGRAM using a binary indicator variable, to 
capture effects unrelated to conditionality such as technical assistance.  
To obtain the total effect of an IMF program (including its conditionality effect), all three 
measures need to be considered. The coefficient on conditionality yields the differential impact of 
a program with a specific condition compared to a program without such condition. We include 
IMF variables using a one-period lag, while the main analysis additionally examines deeper 
annual lags. 
Control variables 
We rely on a standard set of controls identified in the corruption literature; summary statistics and 
detailed variable definitions with data sources are available in Appendix A. An initial control is 
the natural log of GDP PER CAPITA, given that level of development closely relates to efficient 
institutions.3 We also include the POLITY IV INDEX to capture democratic political systems, as they 
increase the likelihood of exposing corrupt practices and reduce incentives for state bureaucrats to 
ask for bribes (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Larraín and Tavares 2004; Montinola and Jackman 2002). 
Further, we control for the HUMAN CAPITAL INDEX from the Penn World Tables, since education 
increases demand for accountability (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015); and an indicator of REGIME 
DURABILITY—the number of years that the current political order has survived since the last 
transformation—from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010), to account for 
legacies of political systems (Charron and Lapuente 2010; Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston 
2009; Jetter, Agudelo, and Hassan 2015).  
In addition, we consider a series of variables that capture opportunities for rent-seeking. First, 
URBANIZATION—the share of the population in urban areas—may affect corruption: higher 
concentration of population in urban areas can yield more opportunities for interaction between 
bribe takers and givers (Billger and Goel 2009). Second, we use MINERAL RENTS as a percentage 
of GDP as well as the natural logarithm of OIL PRODUCTION PER CAPITA (Adserà, Boix, and Payne 
2003; Fréchette 2006; Treisman 2000), since countries relying on natural resources are 
particularly vulnerable to corruption given the adverse effects of natural resource endowments on 
                                                          
3
 GDP per capita might not be fully exogenous with respect to corruption (Treisman 2000), but there is no 
satisfactory solution to address the problem (Fréchette 2006). Following Jetter et al. (2015), we replaced 
GDP per capita with life expectancy and obtained equivalent results. Therefore, we only report regressions 
with GDP per capita here.  
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government accountability (Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008; Mahdavy 1970; Ross 
2001). Third, increased IMPORT DEPENDENCE may provide more opportunities for officials to 
collect rents, such as by threatening delays in the processing of essential imports (Fréchette 2006). 
Finally, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE can also create rent-seeking opportunities (Adserà, Boix, and 
Payne 2003; Tanzi 1998), although there is no robust evidence that government size 
systematically affects corruption (Persson and Rothstein 2015).  
For the BEEPS and ICVS samples, additional control variables are available from these survey 
datasets. In all models, we include country-fixed effects4 to account for time-invariant factors 
such as colonial history, legal origin, latitude, religion, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and 
federalism (Adserà, Boix, and Payne 2003; La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2000); and time-fixed 
effects to account for time-variant factors that impact corruption equally across countries. We 
calculate cluster-robust standard errors, which adjust for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.5  
While the aforementioned variables are used in previous research, there is no mainstay model of 
corruption control. To ensure our model is parsimonious but minimizes our own discretion, we 
use Bayesian model selection to identify the most plausible set of control variables from the range 
of theoretically meaningful covariates. The result of this exercise yields two sets of control 
variables, depending on the direction of the model selection approach. Under a specific-to-general 
approach, in which one starts from the smallest possible model and includes new variables that 
make the biggest contribution to model fit, control variables include GDP per capita, democracy, 
regime durability, urbanization, mineral rents, and oil production per capita. Under a general-to-
specific approach, which initially starts with all potential variables and subsequently drops 
variables that have zero inclusion probability or that contradict theoretical expectations, the set of 
control variables includes two more variables—government expenditure and the human capital 
index. In the main analysis, we use the general-to-specific approach, leaving the specific-to-
general approach as robustness check. Further details on Bayesian model selection are in 
Appendix C. 
3.2.  Remedies to potential endogeneity  
We face a double inferential challenge of non-random selection into IMF programs and 
endogeneity of conditions. For example, countries whose control of corruption deteriorates may 
be more likely to, first, participate in an IMF program and, second, receive certain types of 
conditions within the program.6 Non-random selection into IMF programs is a well-known 
inferential challenge. The established procedure to address this challenge is to estimate a selection 
model using observed characteristics, and then use the inverse Mills ratio as a control variable in 
the outcome equation (Atoyan and Conway 2006; Heckman 1976; Woo 2013), or include a 
selection equation and estimate a system of equations via maximum likelihood (Roodman 2012). 
Drawing on previous literature, we use the following variables to explain selection of countries 
                                                          
4
 We also conducted a Hausman test, which rejected the use of random-effect estimation (p<0.001).  
5
 We reject the null hypothesis of ‘no autocorrelation’ using the Wooldridge test (p<0.001). Note that we do 
not cluster errors in the ICVS sample due to lack of sufficient observations. 
6
 Empirical approaches such as the Granger causality test do not provide a clear answer regarding the most 
likely direction of the effect. Following the Granger causality test approach, we verified that some past 
realizations of conditionality affect current levels of corruption (p<0.01). At the same time, however, past 
realizations of corruption affect current conditions, albeit less significantly (p<0.05). 
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into IMF programs: PAST PROGRAMS counts the number of program years over the preceding five 
years, as previous participation in IMF programs reliably predicts current participation (Easterly 
2005); COUNTRIES UNDER PROGRAMS counts the number of countries participating in IMF 
programs, which affects the Fund’s resource availability and—in-turn—willingness to commence 
new programs (Vreeland 2003, 88); and UNGA VOTE ALIGNMENT, measuring voting similarity 
between borrowing country and G7 countries in the United Nations General Assembly (Bailey, 
Strezhnev, and Voeten 2015), since allies of big powers receive favorable treatment by the IMF 
(Barro and Lee 2005; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009; Thacker 1999). We also add a series of 
macroeconomic variables to capture the economic rationale for an IMF program, including GDP 
per capita, GDP growth, level of reserves (in months of imports), and debt service as a percentage 
of GNI (Moser and Sturm 2011; Oberdabernig 2013; Vreeland 2003); as well as domestic 
political variables that could determine participation, namely institutional democracy and 
executive elections (Dreher 2003). Finally, we include regional and year fixed effects.  
To account for endogeneity of conditionality, we follow the methodological approach of Stubbs et 
al. (2018). We instrument the number of each type of condition through the interaction of the 
within-country average number of conditions and the period-specific budget constraint of the 
Fund, as measured by the number of COUNTRIES UNDER PROGRAMS. This compound instrument 
fulfils the relevance criterion because when the IMF assists more countries in any period, it has 
less funds available to lend and thus assigns more conditions for approving loan requests (Dreher 
and Vaubel 2004).7 It fulfills the exclusion criterion because country-specific changes in 
conditionality that deviate from its long-run average are brought about only by IMF decisions not 
pertaining to a given country (Lang 2016).   
Thus, we perform analyses over systems of equations via maximum likelihood estimation 
(Roodman 2012). The exact number of equations varies across the three dependent variables, 
because data limitations prevented convergence for more complex models in the BEEPS and 
ICVS samples.  
The models for the ICRG sample entail the following four equations: 
 
Equation 4 is the outcome equation. The key predictors are the three IMF variables—fitted values 
of IMF program ( ), Structural conditions ( ), and Stabilization conditions ( )—as well as 
control variables (Xit), country-fixed effects (4i), year-fixed effects (4t), and an idiosyncratic 
error (4it). Equation 1 is a probit-type selection equation for IMF programs. Equations 2 and 3 
respectively model the number of structural conditions ( ) and stabilization conditions ( ) 
                                                          
7
 Dreher and Vaubel (2004) show that bigger loans come with more conditions attached, since the Fund has 
more of its assets at stake and thus requires more safeguards. We generalize this argument to the number of 
loan programs, which should positively relate to the size of loans under management. 
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using compound instruments (denoted by  and ). We assume a multivariate normal error 
structure allowing for cross-equation correlation of errors (Roodman 2012). 
For the BEEPS sample, we adapt the estimating system in two ways because the smaller sample 
size prevents the above system from converging. First, similar to the ICRG sample, we run an 
IMF selection model (see Equation 5); but instead of calculating fitted IMF variables, following 
the Heckman (1976) approach we instead compute the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). Second, in the 
respective conditionality equations, we use as instruments (  and ) the one-period lagged 
number of respective conditions instead of the compound instruments, because they are weak in 
this context (F<<10).8 The IMR and fitted conditionality variables are then added to the outcome 
equation (see Equation 6). We again assume a multivariate normal error structure.   
  
The ICVS sample has the fewest observations, which imposes even more constraints on our 
ability to control for endogeneity. Specifically, we only correct for non-random selection of IMF 
programs using the Heckman approach (as per Equation 5) with an outcome equation augmented 
by the IMR (Equation 7). 
  
4.  Empirical results 
4.1.  Results using perception-based indicators 
Table 1 presents coefficient estimates for various aspects of IMF programs on the ICRG control 
of corruption measure for different time lags. Consistent with our argument, we find across all 
lags that structural conditions exert a statistically significant negative impact on corruption 
control. Based on the one-year model, every additional structural condition reduces corruption 
control—measured over a six-point range—by half a decimal point. Four additional structural 
conditions (roughly one standard deviation) decrease corruption control by 0.26 (roughly one-
fourth of its standard deviation). In terms of magnitude, this effect is comparable to full-blown 
democratization—an increase in the Polity IV index by more than 10 points. 
Conversely, stabilization conditions remain insignificant, aside from a weakly significant positive 
coefficient in the five-year model (p<0.1). Similarly, the residual effect of IMF programs is 
indistinguishable from zero. Most other control variables are not significant, except mineral rents 
(which weakens corruption control), and regime durability (which strengthens it). This suggests 
that our statistical model yields rather conservative estimates. Diagnostic statistics also indicate 
our model specifications are appropriate. The best-fitting models explain about 30% of the within-
country variation.  
                                                          
8
 We thus predict the (lagged) number of conditions by their second lag, standard controls, and time effects. 
The identifying assumption is that there is no independent impact of twice-lagged conditionality on the 
outcome other than through its effect on lagged conditionality. 
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For the auxiliary conditions equations in our system, we find that the Fund imposes more 
structural conditions in less developed and more urbanized countries, while stabilization 
conditions are more numerous in democracies, urbanized countries, and countries with low human 
capital. Most importantly, the compound instruments are highly correlated with the respective 
conditions they seek to instrument. Model diagnostics indicate our instruments are strong, with 
the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic comfortably passing the minimum threshold of ten (Stock and 
Staiger 1997). Findings in the auxiliary IMF program equation show that country selection is 
predicted by past exposure to IMF lending, voting behavior in the UN General Assembly, and 
macroeconomic fundamentals that reflect need for IMF credit (GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
foreign reserves in months of imports, and debt service), as is consistent with theoretical 
expectations. However, domestic political factors are insignificant.  
[Table 1 here] 
4.2.  Experience-based corruption: Enterprise survey 
Table 2 reports the results based on the BEEPS indicator of corruption: incidence of corruption. 
As shown in Appendix B, our results are also robust to two alternative outcomes, intensity of 
corruption (Table B10) and the proportion of firms reporting bribery when dealing with tax 
officials (Table B11). Unlike before, a positive coefficient on the IMF variables now indicates 
more corruption. Further, we use data averaged over three-year periods to study the impact of 
IMF variables under a one-period lag. Models 6-8 present fixed-effects models (without selection 
correction and compound instrumentation) using no controls, country-level controls, and both 
country and firm-level controls respectively; Models 9-11 do so while accounting for non-random 
selection into IMF programs; and Models 12-14 account for both non-random selection and 
endogeneity of conditions.  
In all models, we find evidence of a corruption-inducing effect of structural conditions. Based on 
Model 8, four additional conditions are associated with 5.7% more firms reporting corruption 
incidents (about 30% of its standard deviation). In instrumental-variable regressions (Models 12-
14), coefficients on structural conditions are up to three times higher. Some models also indicate a 
corruption-abating effect of stabilization conditions, but this result is substantively smaller and 
less significant. A cursory examination of control variables suggest that models conform to 
previous research findings. Higher levels of development and democratic governance are related 
to less corruption, while corruption flourishes under more entrenched regimes. None of the firm-
level covariates are statistically significant. 
Overall, the BEEPS analysis corroborates our previous finding that structural conditions have an 
adverse impact on corruption. Consistent with the analysis, our interpretation is that some firms 
have incentives to offer bribes to mitigate the negative repercussions of structural adjustment 
measures; while public officials—the group most affected by structural measures—are more 
likely to ask for bribes to improve their material situation.  
[Table 2 here] 
4.3.  Experienced-based corruption: Household survey  
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Table 3 offers another check of our argument using the ICVS household survey. The dependent 
variable is the percentage of households victimized by petty corruption in the public 
administration. As the small sample precludes instrumental-variable analysis, we first conduct 
fixed-effects regressions without bias correction from selection of countries into IMF programs 
(Models 15-17), followed by analyses with two alternative sets of variables in the IMF program 
selection model, including past programs, GDP per capita, and Polity IV index in the initial set 
(Models 18-20), as well as GDP growth and reserves in the extended set (Models 21-23). 
In all models, the coefficient of structural conditions is positively related to reported experience of 
corruption. Based on Model 15, ten additional conditions (the standard deviation in this sample) 
are related to increases in the number of households reporting corruption by 2.0% (p<0.05)—
equivalent to one-fifth of its standard deviation. While the magnitude of this effect is slightly 
smaller than in the other samples, it is just as statistically significant. Conversely, stabilization 
conditions have no effect on reported corruption.  
Country-level control variables behave as expected but are not always statistically significant. We 
also obtain results on a number of household-level covariates. For example, if a higher percentage 
of households report they feel safe after dark, their reported corruption is lower—suggesting that 
corruption is less likely to flourish in more capable states with well-functioning police and higher 
levels trust. Conversely, corruption is higher in wealthier neighborhoods, as rent extraction is 
more profitable if targeted at high-income households (see parallels with Mocan (2008)). Finally, 
the incidence of fraud—the term for “corruption” in the private sector and an obvious confounder 
in this analysis—relates positively to reports of corruption, but does not undermine the significant 
finding on key variables of interest.    
[Table 3 here] 
4.4.  Robustness checks 
We conduct additional robustness checks using the ICRG dataset.9 We briefly report the findings 
below; full tables are provided in Appendix B. First, we use an alternative set of control variables 
in the outcome equation (Table B1). Specifically, we use the smaller set obtained from a specific-
to-general Bayesian model selection approach, which removes human capital index and 
government expenditure from the control set. We corroborate our earlier finding that structural 
conditions weaken corruption control, while stabilization conditions have no effect. 
Second, in line with theoretical expectations, we consider the effect of structural conditions on 
corruption control varying the strength of interest groups such as the military, public employees, 
and urban workers (Nelson 1984; Waterbury 1992). We split the sample at the median of our 
proxy measures for interest group influence, namely military expenditure (as a percentage of 
output), the urbanization rate, and non-tax revenue (as a percentage of output). We confirm that 
the negative effect of structural conditions on corruption control is particularly pronounced when 
powerful interest groups exist and when government accountability is limited (Table B2). For 
example, if military expenditure is above the sample mean, the differential effect on corruption is 
1.14 points higher relative to countries below the mean.  
                                                          
9
 The other datasets lacked the observations to allow for equivalent robustness checks. 
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Third, we probe robustness to different specifications of the IMF program equation. Initially, we 
replace PAST PROGRAMS by the logged cumulative amount of IMF credit that a country had used 
in its programs over the past five years (Copelovitch 2010). Then, we examine the stability of our 
variables of interest across 12,615 different first-stage regression models. Our results remain 
consistent throughout.   
Fourth, to ensure results are not driven by the corruption variable source, we replicate our findings 
using the VDem Corruption Index (Coppedge et al. 2016, 66). We find significant corruption-
inducing effects of structural conditions up to four years after countries are exposed to structural 
conditions (p<0.05), while stabilization conditions are not significantly related to corruption 
(Table B5). The estimated corruption effect is similar to the ICRG-based coefficient: four 
additional structural conditions increase the VDem corruption index by up to 5.05 points in the 
first year—equivalent to one-quarter of its standard deviation. Further analysis reveals that 
conditionality-induced corruption is driven mainly by bribe-taking in the executive (Table B6).10 
Finally, we test whether our results hold under alternative model choices. We conducted panel 
analysis using Error Correction Models, which allow us to untangle short-term effects and long-
term effects of IMF conditionality on corruption outcomes. In these models, the dependent 
variable is the difference in corruption outcomes, while the right-hand side includes lags and 
differences of predictors and the lagged corruption level. In doing so, we account for IMF 
program selection and endogeneity of structural conditionality. We find that structural conditions 
exert a long-term adverse effect on corruption outcomes—whether using the ICRG index or the 
VDem corruption index (Table B7). Our core results also hold in simpler models that ignore 
potential endogeneity of conditionality, but which yield more efficient estimates (Table B8-B9). 
 
5.  Discussion and conclusion  
This article explored the relationship between neoliberal globalization and political capitalism by 
examining the potential impact of IMF programs on the control of corruption in developing 
countries. We show that IMF-mandated structural reforms increase corruption—a result that 
remains robust to different specifications as well as to three different measures of corruption and 
associated samples. In contrast, stabilization conditions—quantitative targets for monetary and 
fiscal indicators—do not have a consistent effect on corruption control.  
                                                          
10
 We also tested other widely-used corruption indicators, such as the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index (TI-CPI) and the World Bank Corruption Control Index (WBCCI). These are 
less appropriate for our analysis because of concerns about their usability for panel analysis: Transparency 
International note that “CPI scores before 2012 are not comparable over time” (TI 2018); and the creators 
of the WBCCI state that users should “not focus on short-run year-to-year changes but rather in trends over 
longer periods” (WGI 2018). In addition, compared to our preferred ICRG measure, the WBCCI has 620 
fewer observations and the TI-CPI 920 fewer observations, raising concerns about the representativeness of 
the sample and the power of our tests. Nonetheless, we found that structural conditions weaken corruption 
control, specifically in the endogeneity-corrected regressions that use the World Bank indicator (Table 
B15) and in all models except the endogeneity-corrected ones for the Transparency International index 
(Table B16).  
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These results support a theoretical argument that focuses on the capacity of structural conditions 
to induce concentrated losses on well-defined social groups in borrowing countries, such as 
protected industries, public-sector employees (including military elites), and urban labor. When 
IMF conditions target institutional arrangements, interest groups can mobilize against threats to 
their privileges. Bribing public officials can be a strategy to secure continued protection through 
alternative means; and these officials are susceptible to this pressure because they wish to 
compensate for their own reduction of privileges. In turn, governments tolerate such corruption in 
order to continue rent distribution to powerful groups. An observable implication of this argument 
is that the corruption-inducing effect of structural conditions should be more pronounced where 
interest groups are more powerful, as proxied by their claims on public resources. Additional 
analyses corroborate these hypotheses.  
Before discussing the broader implications of our analysis, we acknowledge two limitations of our 
study that future research may wish to address. First, our inferences are primarily based on 
econometric analysis, which cannot fully resolve ambiguities on potential mechanisms. Future 
studies of country cases can enhance our understanding of how neoliberal policies promote 
political capitalism. These studies may also take into account the changing meanings of corruption 
and identify potential structural breaks in the relationship of interest; for example, whether the 
impact of IMF conditions changed when fighting corruption gained prominence among IMF 
policy economists in the mid- and late-1990s (see IMF 1999).  
Second, the nature of corruption evolves as states undergo development. Historians point to how 
“systematic” corruption (large-scale capture of economic activity by politicians) is—over the 
course of development—eventually replaced by “venal” corruption (pettier attempts of private 
actors to use the political system to extract material benefits) (Wallis 2006). Similarly, 
development economists explain that, as countries undergo periods of economic change, the mix 
of “explicit” corruption (like bribery) and “implicit” corruption (like patronage appointments) 
may change to reflect the adaptation of social actors to the new institutional environment (Yao 
2002). In the context of our research, policy reforms supported by international financial 
institutions—like privatization, austerity and other “governance” reforms—attempt to target venal 
or explicit corruption, which is also what typical indicators of corruption measure (including those 
used in this study). However, systemic or implicit corruption is not accurately captured in such 
indicators, and may well undermine any efforts to control pettier forms of corruption. Future 
studies can explore whether and how international organizations—ranging from the IMF and the 
World Bank to aid donors—can shift institutional environments away from development-harming 
systemic forms of corruption.  
The introduction of neoliberal policies in developing countries did not unleash market capitalism 
but fueled political capitalism by creating or strengthening patron-client networks between crony 
capitalists and corrupt bureaucrats. The IMF was a leading agent catalyzing neoliberal policy 
change, and our findings document that its broad policy prescriptions are unlikely to be uniformly 
beneficial and can exert contradictory effects, with follow-on implications for policy 
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Table 1: IMF conditionality and perceived control of corruption (ICRG sample). 
 
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Control of corruption 
     Structural conditions -0.051**  -0.043*   -0.044*   -0.057**  -0.067*** 
 
(0.025)    (0.025)    (0.026)    (0.026)    (0.026)    
Stabilization conditions 0.148    0.149    0.145    0.170    0.165*   
 
(0.108)    (0.107)    (0.106)    (0.111)    (0.094)    
IMF program -0.062    0.067    0.120    0.092    0.025    
 
(0.140)    (0.155)    (0.143)    (0.137)    (0.132)    
Log(GDP per capita) -0.370    -0.269    -0.233    -0.120    -0.127    
 
(0.419)    (0.419)    (0.393)    (0.444)    (0.432)    
Human capital index 2.290    2.165    1.948    1.930    1.738    
 
(1.452)    (1.443)    (1.400)    (1.504)    (1.441)    
Regime durability 0.014*   0.013*   0.013*   0.013    0.012    
 
(0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.009)    (0.009)    
Polity IV index -0.008    -0.012    -0.012    -0.018    -0.018    
 
(0.030)    (0.029)    (0.027)    (0.028)    (0.025)    
Urbanization -0.042    -0.041    -0.037    -0.039    -0.035    
 
(0.037)    (0.036)    (0.034)    (0.036)    (0.035)    
Government expenditure -0.006    -0.005    -0.005    -0.005    -0.012    
 
(0.017)    (0.017)    (0.017)    (0.018)    (0.017)    
Mineral rents -0.030    -0.039    -0.047    -0.059*   -0.073*   
 
(0.029)    (0.029)    (0.030)    (0.035)    (0.039)    
Log(Oil per capita) 0.050    -0.019    -0.112    0.040    0.210    
 
(0.815)    (0.793)    (0.745)    (0.771)    (0.762)    
Structural conditions                                                                                 
Compound instrument 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 
 
(0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.007)    
Log(GDP per capita) -1.194*   -1.198*   -1.165*   -1.344*   -1.496*   
 
(0.639)    (0.640)    (0.634)    (0.702)    (0.774)    
Human capital index -0.838    -0.861    -0.843    -0.860    -1.256    
 
(0.835)    (0.832)    (0.831)    (0.857)    (0.860)    
Regime durability 0.010    0.011    0.010    0.011    0.011    
 
(0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.011)    (0.012)    
Polity IV index 0.025    0.024    0.023    0.025    0.027    
 
(0.041)    (0.041)    (0.041)    (0.042)    (0.043)    
Urbanization 0.056*   0.056*   0.054*   0.054*   0.060*   
 
(0.029)    (0.029)    (0.029)    (0.032)    (0.036)    
Government expenditure -0.018    -0.018    -0.018    -0.020    -0.019    
 
(0.035)    (0.035)    (0.035)    (0.036)    (0.038)    
Mineral rents -0.066    -0.066    -0.065    -0.058    -0.030    
 
(0.063)    (0.063)    (0.063)    (0.067)    (0.068)    
Log(Oil per capita) -1.645    -1.661    -1.652    -1.642    -1.537    
 
(1.162)    (1.150)    (1.132)    (1.178)    (1.241)    
Stabilization conditions                                                                                 




(0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    
Log(GDP per capita) -1.616    -1.629    -1.470    -1.689    -1.654    
 
(1.714)    (1.706)    (1.677)    (1.718)    (1.815)    
Human capital index -9.028**  -9.113**  -9.011**  -8.900**  -9.363**  
 
(4.261)    (4.226)    (4.164)    (4.348)    (4.528)    
Regime durability -0.025    -0.023    -0.025    -0.021    -0.010    
 
(0.033)    (0.033)    (0.033)    (0.034)    (0.036)    
Polity IV index 0.201**  0.198**  0.189**  0.188**  0.195**  
 
(0.092)    (0.093)    (0.093)    (0.094)    (0.097)    
Urbanization 0.252*   0.255*   0.246*   0.240*   0.254*   
 
(0.131)    (0.131)    (0.131)    (0.142)    (0.147)    
Government expenditure -0.006    -0.004    -0.007    -0.022    -0.018    
 
(0.080)    (0.080)    (0.079)    (0.079)    (0.079)    
Mineral rents 0.073    0.077    0.081    0.088    0.133    
 
(0.091)    (0.090)    (0.090)    (0.114)    (0.150)    
Log(Oil per capita) -3.341    -3.408    -3.363    -3.703    -4.389    
 
(3.147)    (3.118)    (3.048)    (2.959)    (2.918)    
IMF program                                                                                 
Past programs 0.252*** 0.247*** 0.237*** 0.236*** 0.250*** 
 
(0.029)    (0.029)    (0.030)    (0.031)    (0.031)    
UNGA vote alignment 3.276*** 3.230*** 3.204*** 3.159*** 3.638*** 
 
(0.807)    (0.795)    (0.800)    (0.816)    (0.871)    
Countries under programs -0.011    -0.011    -0.009    -0.009    -0.013*   
 
(0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.008)    
Log(GDP per capita) -0.312*** -0.317*** -0.313*** -0.306*** -0.294*** 
 
(0.073)    (0.073)    (0.075)    (0.076)    (0.076)    
Polity IV index 0.000    -0.001    -0.002    -0.003    -0.005    
 
(0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    
Reserves  -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.049*** 
 
(0.014)    (0.014)    -0.015 (0.015)    (0.017)    
GDP growth -0.015**  -0.014**  -0.014**  -0.014**  -0.015**  
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
Debt service 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.008)    (0.008)    (0.009)    (0.009)    (0.009)    
Executive elections 0.070 0.065 0.090 0.105 0.090    
 
(0.070)    (0.070)    (0.070)    (0.071)    (0.075)    
Diagnostics 
     Observations 2140 2143 2145 2149 2153 
Within-R2 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Joint F-statistic 53.97 66.39 70.96 78.53 97.56 
Notes: Multiple-equation instrumental-variable maximum-likelihood regression. The table shows coefficients of each 
equation, suppressing country-fixed effects and year-fixed effects where applicable. All predictors are included at the 
lag specified in the column header. A selection equation for IMF programs was estimated to take non-random 
selection into account, and in which all predictors are lagged one additional period. For each type of conditionality, 
the respective number of conditions is instrumented using the interaction between the country-specific mean of these 
conditions and the number of countries under IMF programs in a given year. Robust standard errors clustered on 
countries in parentheses.  




Table 2: IMF conditionality and bribery incidence reported by firms (BEEPS sample). 
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Structural conditions 1.446** 1.431** 1.414** 1.527*** 1.443** 1.496** 3.493* 2.702* 3.972*   
 
(0.451) (0.417) (0.440) (0.440) (0.418) (0.461) (1.513) (1.280) (1.768)    
Stabilization conditions -0.250 -0.431* -0.487* -0.249 -0.399* -0.388* -0.497 -0.791 -0.904    
 
(0.157) (0.188) (0.207) (0.161) (0.180) (0.167) (0.494) (0.591) (0.498)    
IMF program 0.052 0.938 0.473 7.976 16.831 5.957 8.275 18.400* 8.174    
 
(3.701) (3.661) (4.725) (8.666) (8.699) (7.057) (9.277) (8.905) (7.817)    






































(0.117) (0.123)    












(0.794) (0.879)    












(0.449) (0.436)    
Age of firms 
  
-0.149 
     
-0.676    
   
(0.588) 
     
(0.571)    
State ownership (%) 
  
-1.350 
     
-0.294    
   
(1.960) 
     
(2.033)    
Foreign-owned firms (%) 
  
-0.536 
     
-0.393    
   
(0.426) 
     
(0.435)    
Firms with foreign inputs (%) 
  
-0.211 
     
-0.301    
   
(0.232) 
     
(0.211)    
Foreign inputs (%) 
  
0.240 
     
0.370    
   
(0.310) 
     
(0.290)    
Inverse Mills ratio for IMF program -- -- -- -4.621 -9.924* -3.862 -4.631 -10.696* -5.336    
    
(3.546) (4.256) (3.391) (3.922) (4.183) (3.319)    
Structural conditions 
         Lagged structural conditions -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.164*** 
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(0.043) (0.042) (0.045)    
Control variables -- -- -- -- -- -- yes yes yes 
Stabilization conditions 
         Lagged stabilization conditions -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.312*** 0.303*** 0.379*** 
       
(0.046) (0.045) (0.060)    
Control variables -- -- -- -- -- -- yes yes yes 
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Within-R2 0.19 0.30 0.38 0.19 0.32 0.23 0.19 0.32 0.23 
Observations 145 128 126 139 125 123 139 125 123  
Joint F-statistic -- -- -- -- -- -- 24.34 31.96 33.67 
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘Incidence of corruption’—the percentage of firms facing bribe requests when dealing with public officials. All predictors lagged by one period in a 
panel with three-year periods. Models 1-3 present fixed-effects estimations with varying sets of controls. Models 4-6 additionally estimate selection models for IMF program 
participation and include the inverse Mills ratio as additional predictor. Models 7-9 additionally instrument the number of conditions for each type by their respective one-period lag. 
The joint F-statistic refers to both instruments. Robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  




Table 3: IMF conditionality and experienced corruption by individuals (ICVS sample). 
 
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
Structural conditions 0.199* 0.463*** 0.435*** 0.201* 0.527** 0.475*** 0.201* 0.529** 0.478*** 
 
(0.093) (0.127) (0.106) (0.104) (0.149) (0.097) (0.104) (0.152) (0.098)    
Stabilization conditions -0.105 -0.085 0.037 -0.120 -0.169 -0.030 -0.134 -0.163 -0.029    
 
(0.125) (0.135) (0.124) (0.174) (0.174) (0.141) (0.180) (0.171) (0.149)    
IMF program -3.227 9.776 7.548 -4.711 14.998 12.088 -3.223 14.141 11.110    
 
(3.924) (5.265) (4.463) (8.041) (9.099) (9.243) (8.712) (9.148) (9.348)    
Log(GDP per capita) 
 













































(2.918) (2.110)    












(0.316) (0.331)    












(0.080) (0.088)    












(0.137) (0.112)    












(0.086)    
Inverse Mills ratio 
   
1.408 -0.076 -0.700 0.518 0.409 -0.097    
    
(3.379) (3.491) (3.404) (3.734) (3.610) (3.369)    
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(Within-)R2 0.76 0.93 0.96 0.72 0.85 0.88 0.72 0.85 0.88 
Observations 44 43 43 42 42 42 42 42 42    
IMF selection equation no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo-R2 -- -- -- 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.47 0.47 0.47 
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘Corruption’—the percentage of individuals experiencing petty corruption. All predictors lagged by one period in a panel with gaps and at least two 
survey waves per country. Models 1-3 present fixed-effects estimations with varying sets of controls. Models 4-6 additionally estimate selection models for IMF program 
29 
 
participation, models 7-9 use additional variables in the selection equation. No instruments were used for conditions due to the low number of observations (as models do not 
converge otherwise). Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels:  * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
 
 
 
 
